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NOTES.
THE CONSTITUTION-ALITY AND SCOPE OF THE ALIEN LAND
L'ws.-The constitutionality of state statutes restricting the rights
and privileges of aliens has long been a subject of debate. Several
years ago the controversy centered upon the school exclusion laws.,
I Wn. Draper Lewis, "Can the United States by Treaty Confer on Jap-
anese Residents in California the Right to Attend the Public Schools?', 55
AMER. L. REG. and U. OF PA. L. REv 73 (907); see also William E. Mikell,
"Extent of Treaty-Making Power," 57 AMER. L. REa. and U. OF PA. L. REv.
435, 528 (IoS-o ); Burr, "Treaty-Making Power of the United States"
(1(4). (148)
NOTES
But in more recent years with the increasing numbers of members
of the yellow races in the West, the Alien Land Laws, prohibiting
aliens ineligible to citizenship from acquiring any interest in land,
have assumed primary importance. Starting with California in
19202 many western states' moved by economic necessity,4 have
passed this or similar legislation. This movement has not been con-.
fined to the Pacific states alone, but has also spread .t6 several
widely scattered eastern states.5 These statutes were primarilyO
directed against and, for the most part, affected Asiastics, inasmuch
as the basis of the discrimination in the Land Laws was eligibility
to citizenship, which under the Federal laws has been denied to all
but free white persons.7 But with the passage of the Draft Act$
in 1918 the scope of these lavs has been enlarged. That act makes
incapable of naturalization those nationals of neutral countries who,
having taken out their first papers, were drafted, but obtained ex-
emption by pleading their foreign citizenslip. This may bring into
dispute, in addition to treaties with Japan and China, treaties with
every nation neutral during the World War.
The Supreme Court of the United States in several recent
decisions 9 has upheld the constitutionality of these laws.. The
2Cal. Stat. 192, v. lxxxiii, Cal. Codes & Gen. Laws (Deering, Cons.
Supp. 1917-19) 921; which supersedes the earlier statute, CaL Stats. i913, p.
,o6, Deering General Laws, p. 4o.
'Arizona-Session Laws Ariz. 121, Ch. 29; Colorado-Stat. Colo. 1921,
p. 172; Nebraska-Neb. Comp. Stat. (1922), sec. 5687; New Mexico-Const.
N. M., Art. III, sec. 22; Law 7921, p. 469; Texas-Rev. Civ. Stat. 1911,
tit. 3, amended by Act of Apr. i, ig2i; Gen. Laws 1921, ch. 134; Washing-
ton-Cpnst., Art. II, sec. 33; Laws Wash. 1921, ch. 5o. For compilation of
state statutes see Alien Land Laws and Alien Rights (1921), Doc. 89, 67th
Cong., ist sess.
4For a presentation of the economic problem see Report of State Board
of Control, "California and The Oriental" (192o).
"District of Columbia-Code, ch. 7', sec. 396; Delaware-Act of April 7,
i921; Laws i92i, c. i88, amending Del. Rev. Code, ch. 9i. See 23 CA. L.
Rzv. 388 (April, 1923); also see Alien Land Laws and Alien Rights, op. cit.
"Also held to apply to a British subject. State v. O'Connell, 121 Wash.
542, 209 Pac. 865 (i921).
'Eligible aliens are "free white persons and aliens of African nativity
and descent." Act of July 14, 1870, C. 254, sec. 7, I6 Stat. 256; as amended
by Act of Feb. 18, 1875, c. 8o, i8 Stat. 318; Ozawa v. United States, 26o U. S.
178 (1922), see 71 U. or PA. L Rnv. 169 (1922-23); United States v. Thind,
261 U. S. 24 (19z3).
.40 Stat. at Large 955, U. S. Comp. Stat. (Supp. 1919), see. 2o447/ (a).
'Terrace and Nakatsuka v. Thompson, 1'. S. Sup. Ct., October Term,
1923, No. 29, affirming 274 Fed. 841 (1921); P',rterfield and Mizuno v. Webb,
U. S. Sup. Ct., October Term, 1923, No. 28, affirming 279 Fed. 114 (1921);
Webb v. O'Brien and Inouye, U. S. Sup. Ct., October Term, I923, No. 26,
reversing 279 Fed. 117 (i92i); Frick and Satow v. Webb, U: S. Sup. Ct.,
October Term, ig, No. iir, affirming 281 Fed. 407 (1922). In all these
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Court gives it reasoning at length in Terrace and Nakatsuka v.
Thompson.0 This case arose under the Washington Constitution
and Anti-Alien Land Law," which prohibited any alien who had
not in "good faith" declared his intention to become a citizen to
"own, take, have or hold the legal or equitable title, or right to any
benefit of any land," 1" and provided for forfeiture of the land to
the State in event of violation. In this case the plaintiff, .Terrace,
who was a citizen of Washington -and owned certain farr~g lands
therein, wished to lease these lands to Nakatsuka, a subject of
Japan. But Nakatsuka, being excluded from citizenship, could not
in good faith declare his intention to become a citizen. Both there-
fore brought a bill in equity to enjoin the Attorney General from
enforcing the state statute on the ground that it conflicted with the
Fourteenth Amendment" and with a treaty with Japan. 4 The in-
junction was refused by the Federal Court; and the Supreme Court
affirmed the decision. The facts in Porterfield and Mitino v.
Webb " are practically the same as in the above case, except that
it arose under the California Alien Land Law," which differs from
the Washington law in that the same prohibition is directed against
all aliens ineligible to citizenship. But the court arrived at the same
conclusion in this case.
Is this legislation contrary to the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution? It has been well.
established that the alien inhabitants of a state as well as its citi-
zens may invoke the protection of this clause,2 which secures equal
cases Mr. Justice Butler delivered the opinion of the Court. But Mr. Jus-
tice McReynolds and Mr. Justice Brandeis thought there was no justiciable
question involved and should have been dismissed on that ground. Mr.
Justice Sutherland took no part in the consideration or decisions. For dis-
cussions of the same subject as this note based upon the decisions of the
instant cases in the lower courts, see 1o CAL L REV. 241, 494 (1921-22) ; 31
YALE L JouP. 299 (1921-22); 17 A ml. Joua. INT. LAW 29 (Jan., 1923).
"Supra in note 9.
"Supra in note 3.
'" Butler, J., in Terrace v. Thompson, supra in note 9, p. 2.
"U. S. Const. Amend, Art. 14, sec. I: ". . . no state shall . . .
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." It should be noted that the due process clause is not involved since
the land legislation is not confiscatory. It does not affect vested rights. If a
Japanese owned a farm before the law was passed, he still can continue to
own it.
" Treaty with Japan, Feb. 21, 1911 (37 Stat. at Large i5o4), Art. I.
"Supra in note 9.
Supra in note 2.
For a thorough discussion of this subject see 64 U. OF PA. L. REV.
616 (1915-16); Yick Wo v. Hopkini, 1x8 U. S. 356 (1885); an alien cannot
.NOTES
protection to all in the enjoyment of their rights under like circum-
stances."8 Therefore under its police power the state may discrimi-
nate against aliens when adequate justification is shown."' Following
the rule at common law that no alien may hold land.20 each state in
absence of any treaty to the contrary has the unquestionable right to
determine who may own land within its boundaries.2' Therefore
state legislation that excludes all aliens from the privilege of owning
land, is clearly not against the equal protection clause. But in the
instant legislation a distinction is made within the alien class-(a)
between those who have declared their intention to become citizens
he deprived of the privilege of working: Truax v. Raich, 230 U. S. 33
(1915); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1922). See 72 U. OF PA. L Rv.
46 (November, 1923) for a discussion of the unconstitutionality of the For-
eign Language Laws. Nor of being a barber: Templar v. State Board of
Examiners, 131 Mich. 254. 9o N. NV. io58 (19o2); nor of obtaining a ped-
dler's license: State v. Montgomery, 94 Me. i92, 4 Ati. 165 (igoo). An
alien cannot be taxed more than a citizen: Ex parte Kotta, 2oo Pac. 957
(Cal., 1921) (Poll tax). Nor may colored persons be segregated into cer-
tain parts of a city: Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 6o (i9f7). See 63 U. or
PA. L Rav. 895 (i94-i5).
lin re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436 (1&go); Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U. S.
657. 662 (1892) ; and in Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 337 (92I), the
Court said: "In adjusting legislation to the need of a state the legislature
has a wide discretion and it may be fully conceded that perfect uniformity
of treatment of all persons is neither practical nor desirable, that classifica-
tion of persons is constantly necessary . . . but it must regard real re-
semblances and real differences between things, and persons, and class them
in accordance with their pertinence to the purpose in hand." Thus a State
may require non-residents to obtain licenses for motor vehicles passing
through the state. Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 6x (7914). Also see
St. John v. New York, 2oi U. S. 633 09o5); Mo. Pacific R. R. v. Machey,
127 U. S. 205 (1887).
"'A state may preserve its game for its own citizens and forbid aliens to
hunt: Patsone v. Pennsylvania. 232 U. S. 138 (014); Bondi v. MacKay, 87
Vt. 271. 89 Atl. 228 (1914). But see I, re Ah Chung. 2 Fed. 737 0880). A
state may forbid aliens to have in their possession firearms without special
permit: State v. Rheaume. 116 At. 758 (N. H., 1922). But see People v.
Zerilo. 219 Mich. 635. 189 N. W. 927 (1922). Also note in 24 A. L. R. 111g.
A state may presume its labor for its own citizens and forbid the employ-
ment of aliens upon public works: Heim v. McCall, 239 U. S. 175 (1915);
Crane v. New York, 239 U. S. 195 (1915), affirming 214 N. Y. 154 (z915).
Licenses to sell liquor may be restricted to citizens and denied to aliens:
Trageser v. Gray. 73 Md. 230, 2o Ad. 9o5 (89o). A peddler's license may
be reserved to citizens only: Commonwealth v. Hanna, 195 Mass. 262, -81
N. _. 149 (19o7); Cf. State v. Montgomery, supra in note 17. A pilot may
be required to be a qualified elector: State v. Ames. 47 Wash. 328, 92 Pac.
1.37 (907). See 64 U. OF PA. L. Riv. 616 (1915-16).
'Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, ii U. S. (7 Cranch) 603, 6o
61g, 62o (183); also see I Cooley's Blackstone (4th ed.) 315.* 372; 2
Kent's Commentaries (i4th ed.) 8o,* 54; 3 Tiffany, Real Property (i92o ed.),
sec. 597.
' Hauenstein v. Lynham, too U. S. 483, 484, 488 0879)-, Blythe v.
Hinckley, 1So U. S. 333, 340 0900).
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and those who have not, 2 or (b) between those eligible and ineligible
to citizenship.2 3 It should be noted that the non-declarant class in-
cludes but is not limited to aliens ineligible to become citizens. It
also includes eligible aliens who have not declared their intention, or
who having declared their intention, failed to be admitted to citizen-
ship within seven years after declaration was made.
2 Are these
unreasonable classifications? 
2 5
In Terrace et al. v. Thompson the Supreme Court decided that
"the inclusion of good faith declarants in the same class with citizens
does not unjustly discriminate against aliens who are ineligible or
against eligible aliens who have failed to declare their intention." 
2 6
The reason is that just as the rights, privileges and duties of aliens
differ widely from those of citizens, those of alien declarants differ
substantially from those of non-declarants
2 The classification, fur-.
thermore, is based upon a distinction established by Congress for the
naturalization of aliens,
28 whch in itself is a reasonable one.
"It is obvious that one who is not a citizen and cannot become
one lacks an interest in, and the power to effectually work for the
welfare of the state, and so lacking, the state may rightfully deny
'Washington Anti-Alien Land Law, supra in note 3.
' California Alien Land Law, supra in note 2.
"The Washington Law, supra in note 3, requires that the declaration of
intention shall be made "in good faith." Since under the naturalization laws
of the United States the effect of a declaration of intention terminates in
seven years, such a declaration is presumably not "bona fide" if the declarant
is not admitted to citizenship within that period.
"See In re Ah Chung (i88o), supra in note ig, decided under a statute*
of California prohibiting all aliens incapable of becoming electors of the
state from fishing in its waters, held that this statute was unconstitutional
because it subjected the Chinese to unjust discrimination. But the instant
case of Terrace v. Thompson, supra in note 9, and Porterfield v. Webb, supra
in note 9, expressly overrule this early Federal Court -decision.
' Supra in note 9, at p. 8, opinion by Mr. Justice Butler. Accord: State
v. Rheaurne, supra in note i9; Commonwealth v. Hanna, supra in note xg.
=The differences between declarants and non-declarants are set forth
in the opinion of the Court at page 7 as follows: "Formerly in many states
the right to vote and hold office was extended to declarants, and many im-
portant, offices have been held by them. But these rights have not been
granted to non-declarants. By various acts of Congress, declarants have
been made liable to military duty, but no act has imposed that duty on non-
declarants .... the treaty invoked by the appellants p'rovides that 
thecitizens or subjects of each shall be exempt in the territories of the other
from compulsory military service. oans or mili-
tary exactions or contributions. The alien's formally declared bona fide
intention to renounce forever all allegiance and fidelity to the sovereignty to
which he lately has been a subiect, and to become a citizen of the United
States and permanently to reside therein markedly distinguishes him from
an ineligible alien or an eligible alien who has not so declared."
"Supra in note 7.
NOTES
him the right to own and lease real estate within its boundaries. If
one incapable of citizenship may lease or own real estate, it is within
the realm of possibility that every foot of land within the state may
pass to the ownership or possession of non-citizens." 2
But the California Land Law expressly provides that its restric-
tions are to be excepted to the extent prescribed by any treaty now
existing 30 between the United States and the country of which the
alien is a subject. Does that provision affect this legislation? Mani-
festly if a treaty with Japan gave the right to Japanese subjects to
own land in the United States under the Land Law, the treaty would
control. However, even in the absence of such provision in the state
law, where a Federal treaty conflicts with that law, being by the
Constitution " the "supreme Law of the Land!' it supersedes the
state statute.3" Bu" in the instant case 31 the Supreme Court held
that this legislation was not in conflict with the existing treaty 31 be-
tMeen the United States and Japan, on the ground that the treaty
"not only contains no provision giving Japanese the right to own or
lease land for agricultural purposes.3 5 but when viewed in the light
Terrace v. Thompson, 274 Fed. 841, 849, quoted with approval by the
Supreme Court in the instant case.
"Cal. Stat. 192T, p. lxxxiii, supra in note 2, sec. 2, which provides that
all aliens other than those eligible to citizenship may acquire real property
or any interest therein in the manner and for the purpose prescribed by any
treaty now existing between the United States and the country of which the
alien is a subject, and not otherwise. See Buell, Some Legal Aspects of the
Japanese Question, 17 AMR. Jous. INT. LAW 2, 36 (Jan., i9z'3).
' U. S. Const., Art. 6, par. 2. ". . . all treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law
of the Land: and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything
in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
" Regulating inheritance of land by aliens: Hauenstein v. Lynham, supra
in note 21; Geofrey v. Riggs, 133 U. S. 258 (1889); Wunderle v. Wunderle,
r44 Ill. 4o, 53, 33 N. E. 195 (1893) ; Techt v. Hughes, _29 N. Y. 222, 128
N. FM 185 (1920). Ownership of Land: Tanner v. Staeheli, 192 Pac. 99r
(Wash., 392o) (State Statute not in conflict with treaty with Switzerland).
Alien poll tax in conflict with treaty with Japan: Ex parte Teru, 187 Cal.
20, 200 Pac. 954 (1921).
"Terrace v. Thompson, supra in note 9; Porterfield v. Webb, supra in
note 9.
"Treaty with Japan, Feb. 21, 1011 (37 Stat. at Large i5o4), Art. r:
"The citizens or subjects of each of the High Contracting Parties shall have
liberty to enter, travel and reside in the territories of the other to carry on
trade, wholesale or retail, to own or lease and occupy houses, manufactories,
warehouses and shops, to employ agents of their choice, to lease land for
residential and commercial purposes, and generally to do anything incident
to or necessary for trade upon the same terms as native citizens or subjects,
submitting themselves to the laws and regulations there established."
"The contention of the appellants in the instant cases was that the
treaty granted that privilege.
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oi negtiations" leading up to its consummation, the language shows
that the high contracting parties respectively intended to withhold a
treaty grant of that right...-. The right to 'carry on trade' or 'to
own or lease and occupy houses, manufactories, warehouses, and
shops,' or 'to lease land for residential and commercial purposes,' or
'to do anything incident to or necessary for trade' cannot be said to
include the right to own or lease or to have any title to or interest
in land for agricultural purposes.:- The enumeration of rights to
own or lease for other specified purposes impliedly negatives the right
to own or lease lands for these purposes." 8 This is particularly the
case in the absence of any favored nation clause.31 However, a
treat,, ratified even after the passage of a state law, being the "su-
preme Law of the Land," -I abrogates that statute. Therefore, the
fact that the California law is only made subject to provisions of any
"treaty now e.isting" is likely to prove of no avail. In this connec-
tion the language of the Court in Terrace v. Thonipson is significant:
"Each state in the absence of any trcaty provision conferring the-
right, may enact laws prohibiting aliens from owning land within its
borders." Tie only limitation upon the making of a Federal treaty
Diplomatic correspondents between the United States and Japan over
the 1913 California Statute, supra in note 2, -in which Viscount Chinda in
note of June 4, 1913, claimed that the treaty gave the privilege of leasing
realty, and that the California Statute was in violation thereof. Mr. Bryan,
then Secretary of State, replied on July 16, 1913, that the right to own land
was not conferred by treaty, and was in fact deliberately withheld by sub-
stituting into the treaty "to lease lands for residential and commercial pur-
poses" in place of a more comprehensive clause contained in an earlier draft,
"to lease land for residential, commercial, industrial, nanufacturing and
other lawful purposes." (Italics ours.) See for the entire correspondence
"Annex No. 7," PP. 17-18. Controversy-United States and Japan-Califor-
nia Question, Congressional Library, JV 6888 C2 J4.
'In Terrace v. Thompson, 274 Fed. 84j, 846, quoted with approval by
the Supreme Court in the instant case, the Court said, "In the most liberal
construction of this language that may be indulged in, it cannot fairly be
said that truck-farming is incident to trading . . . in the products of a
farm any more than conducting a sheep ranch or growing mulberry trees is
incidental to the dry-goods trade." Also see U. S. v. Knight, x56 U. S. i
(1894) ; D. I. & W. R. R. v. Yurkonis, 238 U. S. 439 (915).
'Terrace v. Thompson, supra in note 9 at p. To.
' The favored nation clause in a treaty gives to ctizens of a contract-
ing party in the territory of the other, as regards the subject matter of the
treaty, the same rights and privileges extended to the most favored nation
of the contracting parties. Washburn, American Interpretation of the Most
Favored Nation Doctrine, T VA. L. Ray. 257 (i913); Matter of Scutella, 145
App. Div. 156. 129 N. Y. S. -o (1911); Vietti v. Mackie Fuel Co., iog Kans.
179, 197 Pac. 88t (igi) ; see 4 Moore, Digest of International Law, p. 7oz;
U. S. For. Rel., 19T3, p. 645, 647, and 1914, p. 433.
'Cf. Sbciety v. New Haven, 21 U. S. (8 Wheat.) 464 (1823); Geofrey
v. Riggs, supra in note 32; Hauenstein v. Lynham, su pra in note 21; Missouri
v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416 (igig).
NOTES
is that it "be made under the authority of the United States." 41 Al-
though there is some difference of opinion among constitutional
authorities on the exact meaning of this phrase and the extent of its
applications, 4 2 there seems to be little doubt but that the right
of aliens to acquire property in this country is a proper subject for
the exercise of the treaty-making power.43  However, in view of the
strong public sentiment in the WVest against such a treaty, it is very
unlikely that this question will arise.
It should be noted that the 1920 California Land Law and most
of those that followed attempted to prohibit several very common
evasions of the earlier Act. The most common probably was the
ownership of stock by aliens in land-owning corporations. Since
aliens have an unquestionable right to own personal property,4' and
since shares in a corporation are generally regarded as personalty"5-
even where the corporation owns lands,46 this evasion was valid prior
to this Act.47  In Frick and Satowv v. Webb, 4 the Supreme Court,
following Terrace v.- Tho-npson and Porterfield v. Webb, upheld the
constitutionality of that section of the California Land Law 49 which
prohibits any corporation, a majority of whose stockholders are in-
eligible aliens, from acquiring and owning land. The ground for
the decision was that, as the State has power to prohibit, it may adopt
such measures as are reasonably appropriate or necessary to render
exercise of that power effective.50 "It may therefore forbid direct
as well as indirect ownership and control of agricultural lands by
' Supra in note 3r.
'That this is the proper subject matter of a treaty, see Butler, Treaty-
Making Power Under the Constitution, Vol. i, p. 4, and ch. 16; Win. Draper
Lewis, "Can the United States Confer on Japanese Residents in California
the Right to Attend Public Schools?" supra in note i; Burr, Treaty-Mfaking
Power of the United States (1012). For a protest against this view, see
Tucker, Limitation on Treaty-Making Power (igis), ch. io; also see Wil-
liam E. Mikell, Extent of Treaty-Making Power, supra in note x.
"Hauenstein v. Lynham, supra in note 21; Blythe v. Hinckley, supra in
note 21; State v. Steheli, supra in note 32. It also seems that Attorney
General Webb, in an address before the State Attorney General of the United
States, in San Francisco, admitted that such a treaty could be negotiated.
Los Angeles Times, August 9, i9r . See Buell, Some Legal Aspects of the
Japanese Question, supra in note 30, at p. 38, footnote C.
"i R. C. L. 8o.
Machen, Modern Law of Corporations, Vol. r, see. 5o2, and cases cited
therein.
'Russell v. Temple, 3 Dane's Abridg. io8 (Mass., 1798).
' See io CAL. L. RLV. 494 (x921-22). Cf. State v. Traveller's Ins. Co,
70 Conn. 59o, 40 Atil. 465 (1898).
Supra in note 9.
T921 Cal. Stat., p. lxx-ii, see. 3.
'Crane v. Campbell, 245 J. S. 304, 3o7 (1917), and cases cited therein;
Hebe Co. v. Shaw, 248 U. S. 297, 303 (1919).
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ineligible aliens." This goes behind the entity fiction of a corporation
to determine who the shareholders actually are."'
Another evasion was the acquiring of lands by aliens in the
name of their minor native-born children, who, being citizens, could
therefore own land. The Act 12 forbade such aliens from acting as
guardians of that portion of a minor's estate which they could not
themselves hold. In In re Tetazibumi Zano's Estate's a recent Cali-
fornia Supreme Court decision, this portion of the Act was held
unconstitutional as being against the equal protection and due process
clauses. For a classification not to conflict with the equal protection
clause it must be based upon distinctions which reasonably justify a
difference in treatment. "14  Classifications valid for one purpose may
be invalid for other purposes." Eligibility to citizenship may be a
proper classification for ownership of lands. But it by no means
follows that for the same reason he may be denied the right to act
as guardian of his native-born child and the control of its estates,
if he is otherwise competent. This decision is not inconsistent with
the instant cases. Another ground for holding this section of the
Act unconstitutional is that it takes away the property of a citizen-
even though a minor-without due process of law.
Still another method of evading the earlier law was by means of
so-called "cropping contracts" ' made between the owner of the
land and alien Japanese residents, a sort of hybrid between a contract
of employment"' and a lease. The terms usually were as follows:
The owner agreed to "employ" the "cropper" to cultivate the land for
a term of years, furnishing tools and machinery, and reserving the
rights of possession and to terminate the contract at any time. The
"cropper" agreed to plant, cultivate and harvest certain crops, and
deliver them to a place designated by the owner; to employ other help
if necessary, free from interference by the owner; receiving as com-
pensation of his "services" a share either of the crops after harvested
or of the returns therefrom. These contracts also generally contained
a clause that "the cropper shall have no interest or estate whatsoever
in the land."
The California Land Law of 192o, however, failed to prohibit
" See note on this topit elsewhere in this issue.
" 1921 Cal. Stat., p. lxxxiii, sec. 4.
UI88 Cal. 515, 2o6 Pac. 995 (922), one justice dissenting; rehearing
denied.
"See footnotes i8 and xg, supra.
'American Sugar Ref. Co. v. Louisiana, i79 U. S. 89 (1goo); Con-
nolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 54o (igoi).
"For the status of a cropper, see 36 HARV. L. REV. 209 (Dec., 1922).
' Truax v. Raich, supra in note 17; Meye- v. Nebraska, supra in note 17.
See 72 U. OF P. L. REv. 46 (November, 1923).
NOTES
such contracts specifically. It merely provided that ineligible aliens
only "may acquire, possess, enjoy and transfer real property, or any
interest therein . . . to the extent prescribed by any treaty now
existing . . .. and not otherwise." i 1f a cropping contract amounts
to a lease, it is, of course, included under "any interest therein." But
if it is merely a contract of employment, under the doctrine of Truax
-z. Raich,1' any such prohibition would be unconstitutional.
In O'Brien v. lVebb 60 the lower Federal Court granted an in-
terlocutory injunction restraining the Attorney General from interfer-
ing with the carrying out of the agreement, deciding that this crop-
ping contract was not an "interest" in land as was prohibited by
the Act. Following this reasoning, Ex parte Okahara1 wa re-
cently handed down by the Supreme Court of California. It came
up under a criminal prosecution based upon section 1o of the Act,
which made it a conspiracy to transfer land "or any* interest therein"e
in violation of the provisions of the Act and an indictable offense. 2
The Couit held that such a cropping contract on its face did not
amount to "a transfer of an interest in land" under the Act. From
these decisions it would appear that a cropping contract was valid
tinder the Land Law. But the United States Supreme Court in
O'Brien and Inouye v. Webb 's reversed the decision of the lower
Federal Court in the case first mentioned above,8 ' and dismissed the
injunction. The Court decided that. although not a lease; a cropping
contract was more than a contract of employment, even though it con-
tained many elements thereof, and if carried out would give the Jap-
anese alien "a right to use and to have or share in the benefit of the
land for agricidftural purposes," i5 in spite of the express provisions to
the contrary contained therein. The court then determined that the
treaty with Japan 66 does not grant that privilege; that the Land Law
limits the privileges of ineligible aliens to those prescribed by the
treaty; that "the act as a whole evidenced a legislative intention that
ineligible aliens shall not be permitted to have or enjoy any privilege
in respect to the use or the benefit of land for agricultural purposes ;"
and that it is within the constitutional power of the State to deny
to ineligible aliens this privilege. The Court distinguishes Truaxv.
M 1921 Cal. Stat., p. lxxxiii, sec. 2.
' Supra in note 17.
"2.9 Fed. T17 (1921).
216 Pac. 614 (Cal., x923).
Punishable by imprisonment not exceeding two years, or by a fine not
exceeding five thousand dollars, or both.
Supra in note 9.
"Italics ours.
Supra in note 6o.
Supra in note 34.
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Raich 8? as applying only to "common occupations ;" and in re Oka-
hara "I as being concerned merely with whether or not such an agree-
ment is an "interest" in land.
It is submitted that this instant decision goes very far in con-
struing the "legislative intention" of a State statute even beyond the
construction put upon it by the State Supreme Court. Usually the
construction given it in the State Courts is conclusive upon the
Supreme Court.", However, the California Supreme Court-will most
likely accept the favorable construction put upon the statute by the
instant case, and follow it. The Washington Land Law, which in-
cudes in its prohibition "the right to any benefit in land," 70 of course,
would under the instant decision exclude cropping contracts. It is
submitted, therefore, that cropping contracts, though not expressly
prohibited, are nevertheless invalid under the Land Laws.
S. H. S.
THE MoDERN TENDENCY TO DISREGARD THE THEoRY OF CoRPo-
RATE ENTITY.-One of the most perplexing problems of the law has
long been the corporate entity theory. From the early common law,
jurists, attorneys and text-book writers generally both here and
aboard have advanced theories, doctrines and dogmas of every va-
riety to unravel the so-called "magic" which has made a corporation
a personality.1 In the maze of decisions which have been handed
down on the subject many widely divergent views are represented
Just how strictly the entity should be preserved, whether any circum-
stance justifies the lifting of the veil and where the line should be
drawn between a too strict application and a too lax adherence are
but a few of the questions that have baffled the courts for more than
a century.2 For some years several authors have attempted to align
the decisions, claiming that many cases referred to as involving a
repudiation of the entity theory because of certain detached state-
' Supra in note zy.
'Supra in note 6x.
'Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. 485 (z877).
7'Supra in note 3, see. I (d): "To 'own! means to have the legal or
equitable title to or the right to any benefit of" land.
'Articles on "Corporate Personality" in 24 HARv. L. REV. 253 and 347
give complete review of the various theories with hisforical background. See
also Taylor. Corporations-Preface to Third Edition, and Morawitz, Cor-
porations-Preface to Second Edition.
I See 12 COL L. REv. 496 for complete line of decisions illustrating the
inconsistenci of the courts.
'See Thompson, Corporations, .(2d ed.) I5, for discussion of when the
entity should be upheld.
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ments therein, are really in principle reconcilable.4 But in the light
of recent cases it is hardly likely that any author would continue to
maintain such a position.
In the recent Supreme Court case of United States v. Walters
an entirely different aspect of the problem has arisen still further
to confuse the corporation lawyer. In that case the third count of
the indictment is based upon sec. 37 of the Criminal Code, Act of
March 4, 1909, C 321: 35 Stat. io88, punishing conspiracy "to de-
fraud the United States in any manner for any purpose." Walter
made and presented for payment a fraudulent claim against the Emer-
gency Fleet Corporation, a company organized under the laws of
the District of Columbia in which the United States was the sole
stockholder. In holding that the United States could maintain suit,
Justice Holmes based his decision on the ground that the contemplated
fraud upon the corporation, if successful, would have resulted di-
rectly in a pecuniary loss to the United States. Said the Justice:
"As to the third count, while it is true that the corporation
is not the United States, the contemplated fraud upon the corporation,
if successful, would have resulted in a pecuniary loss to the United
States, and even more immediately would have impaired the efficiency
of its very important instrument. We are of opinion that it was
within the words of sec. 37, 'defraud the United States in any man-
ner' and that on this as on the other point the decision below was
wrong."
The fact that all of the stock is owned by one person should not
have had any bearing on the decision. In Ulmer v. R. R. Co. the
rule was laid down that a'corporation is an entity irrespective of the
persons who own all its stock and the fact that one person owns all
the stock does not make such owner and the corporation one and
the same person. And it has been held similarly by all the courts
which have regarded with favor the entity theory.
7
'See cases cited in support of the theory by Mr. Canfield in 17 Co. L.
Rv. i2&
'Advance Sheets-No. 20, October Term, 1923.
"98 Me. 579, 57 At. 1001 (1904).
' Button v. Hoffman, 61 Wis. 2q, 2o N. NV. 667 (1884), held a sole stock-
holder of a corporation could not bring an action in his own name for
replevin of the corporate property.
Baldwin v. Canfield, 26 Minn. 43, 1 N. W. 261 (1879), held that the sole
stockholder could not convey in his own name either equitable or legal title.
See also Canfield & Wormser, Cases on Corporations, pp. 7-I and notes.
Compare First National Bank of Gadsden v. Winchester, ixg Ala. i68, 24
So. 351 (ig), and Swift v. Smith, 65 -Md. 428, 5 AtL 534 (886), where
contrary opinions are given; and see criticism in article by L Maurice
Vormser, 12 Cot. L. Rav. 496 (1917), PP. 515-517.
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Nor should the fact that the fraud upon the corporation would
if successful result in a pecuniary loss to the United States, change
the verdict if the entity theory is to be observed to the letter. Thus,
in United States v. Strang,s decided less than three years before
the principal case, the Supreme Court specifically recognized, the
Emergency Fleet Corporation as a separate entity 9 in spite of the
fact that the United States owned all the stock and that there also
it would have suffered a financial loss if the fraud had been success-
flt. In that case Strang acted as an agent for the Fleet Corporation
in placing certain contracts with an outfitting company of which he
was also a member. It was held that he was not an agent of the
United States within the meaning of a section of the Criminal Code
forbidding an agent of any corporation from acting as an agent of
the United States.
It is interesting to note the language of the court in Lord and
Burnham Co. v. United States Shipping Board Eincrgency Fleet Cor-
poration,0 where the plaintiff sued the Fleet Corporation for damages
by reason of a cancellation by the defendant of a contract for a num-
ber of ladders. "It must be assumed," said the court,"' "from the
very fact of the provision for the incorporation of the defendant,
that it was intended that it should be a real corporation, with all its
powers, rights and obligations intact. To hold otherwise would be
to hold that Congress did the wholly purposeless thing of incorporat-
ing under the board, things which, as a governmental agency, the
board would have ample authority to do."
In another recent case 12 it was argued that the suit should not
be allowed because the United States as the only stockholder was
the real party in interest and the sovereign power could not be sued
without its consent. But the court regarded the corporation as a sep-
arate person entirely distinct fFni the United States and therefore
capable of being sued. Also it is clear that if the suit had been
brought against a stockholder for a tort of the corporation, it would
not be allowed even though the defendant owned most of the stock
1
3
In many other cases, covering a wide range of jurisprudence,
a corporation has been regarded as an entity even where an apparent
'254 U. S. 491 (1920).
*Id., p. 492.
"265 Fed. 955 (192D).
"Id., P. 957.
"Sloan Shipyards v. Fleet Corporation, 258 U. S. s54 (1921), citing
Bank of Urlited States v. Planters Bank of Georgia, 9 Wheaton 9o4 (1824);
and Bank of Kentucky v. Wister, etc., 2 Peters 318 (1829).
' Werner v. Hearst, 177 N. Y. 63, 69 N. E. 221 (1903). The plaintiff
who was run down by the delivery wagon of a newspaper corporation in
which the defendant owned most of the stock, brought suit against him as an
individual, claiming he really owned the wagon and employed the driver.
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injustice is done.14 Thus for the purposes of taxation, it has been
held frequently that a corporation is so distinct from its individual
stockholders that a tax on the individual shares and also on the
property of the corporation did not amount to double taxation., The
distinction between corporate assets and corporate shares was ex-
plained in the recent Supreme Court case of Des Moines Naional
Bank v. Fairweathcr.'6
One extreme application of the entity doctrine was made in a
Virginia case. 7 A piece of land was conveyed by deed, which em-
braced a covenant that the title shall never vest "in a person or per-
sons of African descent." The land was subsequently transferred to
to a corporation composed exclusively of colored people and the ques-
tion for decision was whether this was a violation of the covenant.
The court, enforcing the entity theory, said it was not. It refused
to look behind the veil and consider the fact that all the stockholders
were negroes.
If such decisions were considered alone it would seem obvious
that the decision in the principal case could not be justified. But let
us turn to the language of the eminent justice in an earlier case
cited frequently in support of a strict application of the entity. In.
the case of Donndll v. Hcrring-Hall-Marvin Safe Co." Justice Holmes
said: "Philosophy may have gained by the attempts in recent years
to look through the fiction to the fact and to generalize corporations,
partnerships and other groups into a single conception. But to gen-
"'For a complete review of authorities upholding the entity of a corpo-
ration see article by Mr. Canfield on "The Scope and Limits of. the Corporate
Entity Theory," il COL L, Rnv. 128 (I917), at pp. 129-131.
See Conn. v. Travellers' Insurance Co., ;b Conn. 59o, 4o AtL. 465 (i8S8);
Cook v. Burlington, 59 Iowa 25', 13 N. W. 113 (x88z), and Stone v. R. R.
Co., 202 N. Y. 352 (1911).
"Advance sheets, No. 17, Oct. Term (1923). On p. 7 the Court says:
that although the states may not tax the exempt securities of the United
States, it may tax the shares of a corporation held by the stockholders, al-
though the corporate assets consist largely of such securities and that, in
assessing the shares, it is not necessary to deduct what is invested in the
securities.
"Peoples' Pleasure Park Co. v. Rohleder, io9 Va. 439, 61 S. E. 794
(,go9).
See also Continental Tyre Co. & Rubber Co., Ltd., v. Daimler Co., Ltd.,
i K. B. 893 (I91s), where it was held that to determine whether a corpora-
tion was English or foreign no inquiry could be made into the share regis-
ter for the purpose of ascertaining the nationality of the stockholders and.
that once a corporation has been authorized under English law, it is an Eng-
lish Company notwithstanding that all its stockholders may be aliens.
I 28 U. S. 267 (19o8), where it was held that a stockholder of a corpora-
tion bearing his family name did not lose his right to carry on the business
of manufacturing the same commodity under his own name because the
corporation had sold its good will, trade name, etc.-
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eralize is to omit one characteristic of the complete corporation, as
called into being under modern statutes, that is most important in
business and in law. A leading purpose of such statutes and of those
who act under them is to interpose a non-conductor, through which
in matters of contract, it is impossible to see the men behind." While
apparently supporting generally the fiction of law which recognizes a
corporation as a separate being, the justice indicated by the words "in
matters of contract" that there might be limitations to the doctrine
in cases not involving contract.
Practically all the authorities agree that there may be such limita-
tions. The question therefore arises under what circumstances the
court is justified in lifting the veil-to cast aside the fiction of law
and look behind the individual identity of a corporation. Some judges
have disagreed with the general principle as quoted above from Jus-
tice Holmes and applying his dicta to the case of contracts, have
disregarded the entity of a corporation where the purpose of forming
it was to evade a contractual obligation. Thus in Beal v. Chase,
1'
Chase contracted not to engage in a certain business. He thereafter,
with other persons who knew of his contract, formed a corporation,
of which he was a large shareholder and president, for the purpose
of engaging in the said business. The corporation was enjoined
"from doing said business with or for Chase directly or indirectly.
20
Fletcher on Corporations, 1 says the rule is properly disregarded
in cases of fraud, circumvention of contract or statute, public wrong,
monopoly and like instances. Thus, courts in all parts of the coun-
try have consistently refused to allow the entity of a corporation to
be set up as a defense where it was organized solely as a convenient
means of doing what would otherwise be illegal. The leading case
and one of the most famous of such holdings is State v. Standard
Oil Co.2' There the court, looking behind the corporate personality,
held that the act of a majority of the stockholders in entering into
an illegal and monopolistic trust agreement in their individual ca-
pacities to conceal the real object of their action was the act of the
corporation.2 3  In other words persons cannot escape liability for
deliberate wrongdoing by invoking the entity theory.
"31 Mich. 490 (1875).
"See also Warner's Cases on Corporations, note pp. 144-145 and cases in
Fletcher, Corporations, Vol. x, p. 62.
"Vol. I, p. 57. See also language used by Sanborn, J., in United
States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 Fed. 247, x45 Fed. ioo/
(i9o5), and Morawetz, Private Corporations, sec. x.
"49 Ohio St. 137, 3o N. E. 279 (z892).
"See article by the Hon. C. J. Symth, Chief Justice of the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia, on "Penetrating the Corporate Veil,"
9 GEORGETOWN L J., pp. 1-8 (1921). Also see discussion of People v. North
River Sugar Refining Co., 121 N. Y. 582, 24 N. F. 834 (189), United States
It is in cases of fraud,. however, -that the courts display the
greates-ttendency to get away from the traditional regard, for the
corporate entity. A particular illustration of this is found where
tile corporation has been formed to accomplish a fraud. In such
instances courts have without hesitation disregarded the entity
theory.2
But in all stch cases, the suit is usually by a third person
against the corporation or by the state against the corporation. To
deny the suit would in each instance work an injustice and leave
the complaining party without a remedy. No such situation exists
in the principal case. There the veil of corporate identity was not
lifted primarily to prevent a fraud but rather to allow a stockholder
to prosecute under a section of the criminal code after the fraud
had been perpetrated. Generally where a tort has been committed
against a corporation, it has been held that an individual stock-
holder is not the proper person to bring the suit.25 Therefore it is
submitted the decision in the principal case is a distinct departure
and adds another class of cases to the already long list of those
in which the corporate personality is disregarded.
It is perhaps correct to say, speaking broadly, that the decision
is within the general rule as laid down by Justice Sanborn. in
United States v. Milwaukee Rcfrigcrator Transit Co.., but the de-
v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., supra, note 21; Ford v. 'Chicago
Milk Shippers' Association, 155 111. 66, 39 N. E. 651 (x895); and Distilling
& Cattle Feeding Co. v. People, 156 Ill. 448, 41 N. E. 188 (1895), in 12 Coy-
L REv., pp. 5o8-512 (1912).
In United States v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 22 U. S. 257 (19io), the
Government alleged that the railroad was using the coal company as a sham
and device to evade the "Commodities Clause" of the Hepburn Act which
made it illegal for a railroad to transport in interstate commerce any arti-
cles in which it might have an interest, direct or indirect. The Supreme
Court granted an injunction, declaring in effect that no such evasion could
succeed.
" 4Donovan v. Purtell, 216 I1. 69, 75 N. E. 334 (1905), where a real
estate operator organized straw companies to cloak a fraud.
Linn Timber Co. v. United States, 236 U. S. 574 (x9gs), where, for the
purpose of concealing title, a holder of a fraudulent U. S. patent transferred
property to a corporation controlled by. himself.
Booth v. Bunce, etc, 33 N. Y. i39 (1865), where members of a bankrupt
corporation formed a new corporation to which they transferred all the
property of the former firm in fraud of their creditors. In accord, see In re
Rieger, Kapner & Altmark, 157 Fed. 6o9 (19o7); and Montgomery-Web Co.
v. Dienelt, 133 Pa. s85, i9 Atl. 428 (i8go).
See Tomlinson, et al., v. Bricklayers' Union, 87 Ind. 308 (i882), where
a suit by individual members of a corporation for wrongful conversion of
the corporation property was not allowed. See also Winona, etc., R. R. Co.
v. St. Paul, etc., R.-R. Co., 23 Minn. 359 (1877); Talbot v. Scripps, 3X Mich.
268 (1875) ; and Smith v. Hurd & Others 53 Mass. 371 (x1847).
"See note 2r, supra. The particular rule referred to reads:
"If any general rule can be laid down, in the present state of author-
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sirability of the extension is doubtful. The government elected to
create a corporation that it might enjoy the peculiar advantages
enjoyed by that form of business organization. Should it not also
accept in good spirit whatever disadvantages that organization en-
tails?
D.F.M.
THE CONDEMNATION OF LAND TO COMPENSATE PRIVATE
OWNERS WHOSE LAND HAS BEEN TAKEN FOR A PUBLIC UsE.-
The right of eminent domain is enjoyed by the Federal and the
state governments as an attribute of sovereignty.' Neither the
1 ederal Constittution nor the constitutions of the states, except a
few of the most recent,2 contain any express limitation upon the
purposes for which private property may be taken by eminent do-
main. The Federal Constitution simply provides that private prop-
erty shall not be taken for public purposes without just compensa-
tion,3- and most of the state constitutions contain similar clauses and
no more. The courts, however, practically without exception, have
held that this clause implies a prohibition of taking property for
private purposes, irrespective of whether compensation is given or
not.4 Gibson, C. J., in one case 5 refused to imply such a neaning
to the clause, but the case has not been followed, even in its own
state, Pennsylvania.4
Constitutions of several states, however, do permit a taking
for certain specified private purposes, such as ways of necessity,
drains; irrigation, ditches and similar uses; but the validity of even
these constitutional provisions has been attacked, and in New York
such a provision was held to be violative of the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution, and con-
ity, it is that a corporation will be looked upon as a legal entity as a
general rule, and until sufficient reason to the contrary appears, but,
when the notion of legal entity is used to defeat public convenience,
justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, the law will regard the
corporation as an association of persons."
'Philadelphia Clay Co. v. York Clay Co., 241: Pa. 3o, 88 Ad. 487 (1913).
'Arizona, Art. 11, sec. i7; S. Carolina, Art. I, sec. i7; Wyoming, Art.
I, sec. 32.
I Fifth Amendment.
'Bloodgood v. Mohawk R. R. Co., i8 Wend. 59 (N. Y. 1837); Am-
sperger v. Crawford, ioi Md. 247, 61 At. 413 (igo5); Philadelphia Clay Co.
v. York Clay Co., supra note i.
' Harvey v. Thomas, io Watts 63 (Pa. i84o).
:Hayes v. Risher, 32 Pa. 169 (x858)..
"Provisions of the various state constitutions are collected in Lewis,
Eminent Domain (3d ed.), secs. 2S7-3o5; also, -Nichols, Eminent Domain,
sec. 8.
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sequently void.8 The United States Supreme Court has refused
so far to declare any such provision of a state law or constitution
unconstitutional, but it has asserted the possibility of its doing so
if a clear enough case should arise.0 But with these exceptions in
some states, it may safely be said that no court in the country
would now say that the right of eminent domain may be exercised
for private purposes.10
The problem then is to determine the nature of particular uses.
This is a matter for the courts," and the views taken in many of
the cases are utterly irteconcilable ivith each other. - The term "pub-
lic use" has gradually been extended by some courts to include uses
which are apparently largely private, and which other courts still
regard as private.'0
A further extension, seemingly radical even when compared
with the most advanced of the previous decisions, has been made
by the United States Supreme Court in the recent case of Brown
v. United States.'" The plans of a government irrigation project
in Idaho called for the building of a dam and the creation of a
reservoir, the waters of which would flood a considerable portion of
a large town. The government proposed to move the town to a
new site, giving the dispossessed owners new lots in exchange for
their old ones. Congress authorized purchase or condemnation of
land for the new site.'4  The plaintiffs, owning a tract that was
needed for the town-site, asked an excessive price for it, and con-
demnation proceedings were instituted against it. The plaintiffs
In the Matter of Tuthill, 163 N. Y. 133, 57 N. E- 303 (1900).
Hairston v. Danville & Western Ry. Co., 208 U. S. 598 (igo8).
2'Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Mining Co., 196 U. S. 239
(io5) ; Salisbury Land Co. v.* Commonwealth, 215 Mass. 371, o2 N. E.
619 (1913) ; Penna. Mutual Life b s. Co. v. Philadelphia, 242 Pa. 47, 88 At.
904 (913).
( Philadelphia, etc., Street* Ry. Co.'s Petition, 203 Pa. 354, 53 AtL I9i
(1902) ; Walker v. Shasta Power Co., 83 C. C. A. 66o, i6o Fed. 856 (19o8);
Salisbury Land Co. v. Commonwealth, supra note o.
'Views on mining uses present a striking example-held to be public in
Dayton Mining Co. v. Seawell, ii Nev. 394 (i876); Hand Gold Mining Co.
v. Parker, 59 Ga. 419 (1877); Highland Boy Mining Co. v. Strickley, 28
Utah 215, 78 Pac. 296 (19o4); held to be private uses in Valley City Salt
Co. v. Brown, 7 W. Va. 191 (1874); Consolidated Channel Co. v. Central
Pacific Ry. Co., 5, Cal. 269 (1876); Waddell's Appeal, 84 Pa. go (1877);
Phila. Clay Co. v. York Clay Co., supra note 1.
'U. S. Supreme Court, Oct. Term, 1923, No. 97, 1923-1924, U. S. Adv.
Ops. 104.
can Fl .with authority in connection with the construction of Ameri-
can Falls Reservoir to purchase or condemn and improve suitable land for a
new town-site, . . . and to exchange and convey such lots in full or
part payment for property to be flooded by the reservoir, and to sell for
not less than the appraised valuation any lots not used for such exchange."
41 U. S. Stat. 1367, i4o3.
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contended that the condemnation was taking private property for
private purposes, since the lots were to be turned over to the own-
ers in fee, for their exclusive use. The Supreme Court, however,
declared that it was for a public use, and upheld the proceedings.
Only one case, Pitznogle v. Western Md. R. R. Co.', was cited in
support of the decision.
Cases closely analogous are rare. In one, land was allowed
to be condemned to restore part of a turnpike destroyed in con-
struction of the Erie Canal, but the decision was on the ground
that the turnpike was a public road and so itself a public use. 8 But
the right of a governmental agency to take land to turn over to the
exclusive use of a private owner has been consistently denied, even
when closely connected in one way or another with a public pur-
pose.'? In two similar cases the question arose incidentally and in
both it was held that a road board had no power to give a mill
owner whose dam had been destroyed by road improvements, the
right to build a new dam on land of a third party.' 8 In Salisbury
Land Co. v. Co momnicealth,19 an act which authorized condemna-
tion of a large tract for a public reservation, with power to sell or
lease to private persons any parts not needed for reservation pur-
poses, was declared unconstitutional as allowing a taking for pri-
vate use.
The opinion in the Brown case dwells largely on the difficulty
of justly compensating the ousted inhabitants of the town with
money, and the much greater justice to be achieved by the course
pursued in providing them with new lots. From this the Court
reaches the conclusion that acquisition of the new site was a public
necessity, and, consequently, the condenumation for a public use.
The reasoning of the Pitcnoglc case is similar and is quoted by the
Court." Certainly, a hard situation was presented and it can
scarcely be doubted that the decision well serves the ends of justice.
The plaintiffs were prevented from extorting an excessive price for
their land, the new occupants are much more fully compensated
than they would have been with money.
isxg Md. 673, 87 At. 917 (1913).
"eRogers v. Bradshaw, 2o Johns. 735 (N. Y., 1823).
'Att'y General v. City of Eau Claire, 37 Wis. 400 (875); Berrien
Springs Power Co. v. Berrien Circuit Judge, 1.33 Mich. 48, 94 N. W. 379
(1903).
'Commonwealth v. Peters, 2 Mass. 125 (1803); Wheeler v. Essex Pub-
lic Road Board, 39 N. J. L 2p (i871).
" Supra note io.
"' "The condemnation of a part of this land, here sought to be condemned,
for a substitute private road or way, is incident to and results from the tak-
ing by reason of public necessity, of the existing private road for public
use, and the use of it for such pfirposes should. we think, be regarded as a
public use within the meaning of the Constitution." Patteson, J., in Pitz-
nogle v. Western lid. R. R. Co., supra note 15.
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It is said that hard cases make bad law. This one, at least,
makes new law. It stands for a proposition undoubtedly new-
that a citizen's property is taken for a public use when it -is taken
to recompense another citizen for land taken from the latter for
a public use. But this is only the result of a more fundamental
novelty upon which the whole decision rests. In prior cases the
basic problem agreed upon by every court, has been the determina-
tion of the nature of the use to which the land was to be put after
it was taken.2 1  To sustain a condemnation the courts felt bound
to find in the intended use of the land some public benefit.2 2 Here,
however, the intended use is utterly disregarded-since it is so
obviously private-and the decision is based entirely on the motives
and moral necessities of the taking. It is quite likely that the prin-
ciples of this case will be followed only in cases involving almost
exactly analogous facts. But if application of the case should not
be so confined, an extensive new field would be opened to the exer-
cise of of eminent domain.
L C.A.
Tim TEST OF LEGAL- REspoNSIBILITY FOR INSANE PERSONS.-
What shall be the degree, and how the law shall determine the
existence of that degree, of insanity, necessary to render a person
criminally irresponsible for his actions, have long been matters of
contention between law and medicine and we do not seem to be
approaching an agreement today.'
Almost as far back as the common law reports extend,2 we find
in force the principle, that a madman is not punishable for his
acts---"Although .he has broken the words of the law, he has not
broken the law." 3  Madness was considered an act of God' rather
than a medical phenomenon, almost nothing being understood about
it medically.5 As a result the earliest tests to determine its exist-
ence and the extent of it necessary to excuse otherwise criminal
S"Land cannot be taken under exercise of the power of eminent do-
main unless, after it is taken, it will be devoted to the use of the public,
independent of the. will of the taker." Carpenter, J., in Berrien Springs
Power Co. v. Berrien Circuit Judge, supra note 17; Pa. Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Phila., supra note io.
"Dayton Mining Co. v. Seawell, supra note 12; Hand Gold Mining Co.
v. Parker, supra note 12.
'Ray, Med. Jour. of Insanity, Sec. 24. White, Insanity and the Crimi-
nal Law, w03. Witthams and Becker, Vol. III, 349.
2For history of this subject see Parry, Insanity in Crim. Cases, 63
Albany L J. 429.
*Reninger v. Fogoffa, I Plowden 19 (Eng., 1551).
' Note 3 supra.
'Ray, supra. note r, See. x.
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actions, were crude." To be excused, a man must have "wholly
lost his memory and understanding" , or have no more "understand-
ing and memory, and doth not know what he is doing, no more
than an infant, than a brute or a wild beast."' However, the rea-
son for holding that a madman could not be responsible at law
was well understood even in those early times; Coke says that
"no felony or murder can be corrpnitted without a felonious intent
and purpose." 9
By the middle of the Eighteenth Century, however, the law-
yers, it would seem, recognized that insanity was primarily a medi-
cal question, for they crystallized principles then current in
medicine," a science still in its infancy, into the legal test, that
to be acquitted the prisoner must be unable to discern the difference
between right and wrong."
1 This was further developed, until in
1843 it was finally laid down in the now famous McNaghtcn case
"that to establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be
clearly proved that at the time of committing the act the party
accused was laboring under such a defect of reason from disease
of the mind as not to know the nature and quality of the act he
was doing, or if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing
what was wrong." 12 This statement of the test remains still in
force in England 13 and forms the basis of the sole test applied
today in the majority of jurisdictions in the United States." The
' Ray, supra note x, Sec. 4.
'Coke in Beverly's Case, 2 Coke, Part IV, i23b.
' Arnold's Case, x6 Howell St. Tr. 746 (Eng., 17z4).
'Coke, supra note 7.
See opinion of Somerville, J., Parsons v. State, 8i Ala. 577, 584 (886).
Keedy, "Insanity and Criminal Responsibility," 30 HA.v. L. Rxv. 535.
* Earl Ferrers' case, i9 Howell St. Tr. 886, 949 (Eng-, 1766).
McNaghten's Case, io Cl. and F. 200, 210 (Eng., 1843).
"Rex v. Quamby, i5 Cr. App. R. 163 (Eng., I92o).
"California-People v. Zari, 54 Cal. App. 133, 201 Pac. 345 (1921);
Georgia-Hinson v. State, i54 Ga. 242, o9 S. . 661 (1922); Kansas-State
v. White, 112 Kan. 83, -09 Pac. 660 (1923); Maine-State v. Knight, 95 Me.
467, 50 Atl. 276 (i9ox) ; Maryland-Spehcer v. State, 69 Md. 28, 33 A .Sog
(i888); Michigan-People v. Finley, 38 Mich. 482 (1878); Minnesota-State
v. Scott, 41 Minn. 365, 43 N. W. 62 (1889); Mississiopi-Garner 
v. State,
112 Miss. 317, 73 So. 5o (3916); Missouri-State v. Riddle, 245 Mo. 451, 150
S. W V 1o. (3912); Nebraska-Kraus v. State, io8 Neb. 331, 187 N. W.
8g5 ('922)'; New Jersey-State v. Carrigan, 93 N. 3. L 268, io8 AUt. 315( e or--People v. arlin,19 .
(920) ; New York-Pol v.~ri,34N .~, 87 N. F. 805 (igog);
Nevada-State v. Lewis. 2o Nev. 33 (18389) ; North Carolina-State v.
Terry, 92 S. E. 34 (N. C., 937); Oklahoma-Roe v. State, 17 Okla. Cr.
587, 193 PaC. io48 (92o); Oregon-State v. Hassing, 60 Ore. 8t, z18 
Pac.
195 (393) ; South Carolina-State v. Bramlett, 114 S. C. 389, 103. S. F_. 755
(392o); South Dakota-State v. Lcehman, 2 S. D. 171, 49 N. W. 3 (89x);
Tennessee-McElroy v. State. 242 S. W. 883 (Tenn., 1922); Texas-Parker
v. State, 91 Tex. Cr. App. 68, 238 S. W. 943 (1922); West Virginia-State
v. Harrison, 36 W. Va. 729, 35 S. F. 982 (1892); Wisconsin-Obon v. State,
x43 Wis. 249, x6 N. IV. 737 (1910).
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recent Oklahoma case of Sloan v. State 15 is only one of many
modern cases to maintain, as the only test, this so-called "right and
wrong" test, used for the first time over one hundred and sixty
years ago.
The "right and wrong" test was soon repudiated by medical
authority as too narrow?' The chief criticism was that it failed
to take into consideration the insane person who was laboring under
what was known as "irresistible impulse"-i. e., an impulse due to-
mental disease, to do an act, so strong that, even though he knows
it to be wrongful both legally and morally and desires not to do it,
his will cannot control the impulse, and it forces him to do the
act. Thus, it was stated by medical authority, from which all
knowledge of insanity is derived, that an insane person might know
right from wrong as to his act and yet be forced by insanity against
his will to do the act.'7 In other words, his act is without volition.
It is a principle of the criminal law that an act which is involun-
tary does not amount to crime.18
To provide for this deficiency in the "right and wrong" test,
many jurisdictions in this country " have adopted as an adjunct
to it a further test, so that even, if the insane person "did.have
such knowledge (of right and wrong) he may nevertheless not be
legally responsible if the two following conditions concur: (i) If by
reason of duress of such mental disease, he had so far lost the
power to choose between right and wrong and to avoid doing the
act in question that his free agency was at the time destroyed. (2)
And if at the same time the alleged crime was so connected with
Sloan v. State, 218 Pac. 717 (Okla., 1923).
" Guy and F., Forensic Med., 2-o. "The whole management of such
(insane) asylums presupposes a knowledge of .right and wrong on the part
of its inmates."
Ordronaux, Judicial Aspects of Ins., 423 (1877), quotes that British
Assoc. of Med. Officers of Asylums and Hospitals for Insane unanimously
passed, at annual meeting, 1864, the following resolution: "Resolved, that-
so much of the legal test of the mental condition of an alleged criminal
lunatic as renders him a responsible agent, because he knows the difference
between right and wrong is inconsistent with the facts well known to every
member of this meeting, that the power to distinguish between right and
wrong exists very frequently in those who are undoubtedly insane and is
often associated with dangerous and uncontrollable delusions."TDean, Med. Jour., 497.
'* See Keedy, supra in note 1o, 546.
" U. S. Supreme Court-Davis v. U. S., 163 U. S. 373 (1896) ; Alabama-
Wade v. State, x8 Ala. App. 322, 92 So. 97 (iqx) ; Arkansas-Bell v. State,
T2o Ark. 530, i8o S. V. 186 (1915); Connect:cut-State v. Saxon, 87 Conn.
5, 86 At. 590 (1913) ; Delaware-State v. Jack, 58 Atl. 833 (Del.. i9o3) ; In-
diana-Morgan v. State, 13o N. E. 528 (Ind.. 1921); Kentucky-Hall v.
Comm., I55 Ky. 54r, 159 S. \V. 1155 (913); Pennsylvania-Comm. v. Hal-
lowell, 223 Pa. 494, 72 At 845 (:909); Vermont-State v. Kelley, ;4 Vt.278, 52 Atl . 434 (1902). "
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such mental disease in relation of cause and and effect as to have
been the product of it solely" 20
Due, no doubt, to a misconception of the theory underlying
these alternative tests, some cases have stated them in the conjunc-
tive,21 thus requiring that the prisoner must be incapable of dis-
tinguishing right from wrong, and also must have been forced to
act by an irresistible impulse. This, of course, is absurd, for under
this test only those subject to irresistible impulse could be acquitted,
yet irresistible impulse is only one of many forms of insanity; and
the primary purpose for adding this test, namely, to allow the
defense of insanity to acquit such persons despite their knowledge
of right and wrong, is thus defeated.
Ignoring the logic behind it,2 2 most courts in the United
States have refused to accept this irresistible impulse test for va-
rious reasons " and still hold that inability to distinguish right from
wrong is the sole test.24  Either they refuse to accept the statement
of medical authority that such impulse exists,25 confuse if with emo-
tional insanity and consider it too difficult of proof and therefore
dangerous, as opening the door to successful pretense of such
insanity, 6 or they feel themselves bound by the doctrine of stare
decisis.'7
Even the addition of the irresistible impulse test did not sat-
isfy the medical authorities. It was claimed that there could
be no set test to determine whether an insane person is irresp6n-
sible or not. "We have seen too often the deplorable failure of
such general terms to protect the miserable subjects of disease." 2
Responding to these medical views, the New Hampshire court in
State v. Jones -' gives them legal expression. Having accepted the
opinion that no test can be found, Ladd, J., succinctly states the
problem before the court: "At the trial where insanity is set up
as a defense two questions are presented: First, Had the prisoner
a mental disease? Second, If he had, was the disease of such char-
acter-as to take away the capacity to form or entertain a criminal
"Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, So (i886).
'People v. Geary, 298 111. 236, 23i N. 1. 652 (192); State v. Kelsie,
io8 Atl. 39i (Vt., 1919). See State v. Kelley, supra note ig, which it cites
to support it. Also Commonwealth v, Cooper, 219 Mass. i, io6 N. E. 545
(1924).
"See Keedy, supra note io, 548.
'Keedy, note io mipra, 549.
"Those jurisdictions cited supra, note 14.
'State v. Felter, 25 Iowa 67, 83 (1868).
'People v. Coleman, i N. Y. Crim. R. T, 3 (1881).
'Reg. v. Burton, 3 F. and F. 772, 780 (Eng., 1863).
'Ray, supra note I, Sec. 43. Se White, supra note !, 2o4.
" 50 N. H. .1g (187z).
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intent?" " The first question he holds to be a question of fact for
the jury. as do all the cases. It is in his treatment of the second,
which, he claims, is likewise a question of fact for the jury, that
he abandons precedent and refuses to apply any legal test of re-
sponsibility. As to the jury's difficulty in deciding it without a
legal rule to follow, he continues: "No formal rule can be applied
in settling questions which have relation to liberty and life, merely
because it will lessen the labor of the Court or jury." Virtually the
same view was taken in a case before this court the year previous.8 '
No other jurisdiction, however, except New Hampshire has
adopted this principle of leaving it as a pure question of fact for
the jury, whether the insane person was able to entertain a criminal
intent. An Alabama case 32 states that no test should be applied,
but then proceeds to set forth the right and wrong and the irre-
sistible impulse tests ;1 and an Indiana case 3 4 refers in a dictum
to State v. Jones 3 1 with approval, but later cases in that state adhere
to the tests. However, the committee composed of both doctors
and lawyers. appointed by the American Institute of Criminal Law
and Criminology to study this subject, incorporated into a bill which
it drafted, the following section: "When 'Mental Disease a Defense.
No person shall hereafter be convicted of any criminal charge when
at the time of the act or omission alleged against him, he was suf-.
fering from mental .disease and by reason of such mental disease
he did not have the particular state of mind that must accompany
such act or omission in order to constitute the crime charged." 38
Here we have the view of State 'v. Jones with the addition that not
only must the insane person be able to entertain an intent, but
must be able to entertain the particular intent, required to exist
for the crime charged.
This view has the very great advantage of being based on logical
legal reasoning. That the defense of insanity if proved negatives
the intent, was pointed out by Coke in early times87 Nearly every
crime by definition requires as one of its elements a particular state
of mind or intent.3 8 What that particular state of mind must be
may vary with each crime. Having proved the insanity to be
" Note 29 supra, 393.
State v. Pike, 49 N. H. -399 (i87o).
"Parsons v. State, supra note 2o. 587. "So it is equally obvious that
the courts cannot upon any sound principle undertake to say what are the
invariable or infallible tests of such disease."
"See note 2o supra.
"Stevens v. State, 31 Ind. 485 (1869).
"Supra note 29.
"See Keedy, supra note io.
"See note 9, supra.
" As to those which do not, see Keedy, supra note io, 543.
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present, the next step is to ascertain whether under such condition
of insanity the particular intent necessary was present. If it was
not, by definition of the crime, the prisoner cannot have committed
it. Whether the intent exists is just as much a question of fact
for the jury on the evidence, as it is where the defense of insanity
is not offered.
In considering the difficulties and dangers of such a method
of determining criminal responsibility of the insane, we must not
overlook proposals offered from both legal and medical quarters
providing for more reliable expert testimony,'9 as well as provisions
for the disposal of those persons acquitted because insane, in
asylums under State and court supervision.
40
It is to be hoped that the efforts to remedy the existing con-
flict, legal and medical, on these subjects will be successful, for it
is surely to the discredit -of the law that the same insane person
should be criminally responsible in one state and not in another;
and, furthermore, that the law should refuse to recognize the con-
clusions of medical science.4
1
G. S. S.
EFFECT OF THiRD PARTY BENEFICIARY'S PART PERFORMANCE
OF AN ORAL CONTRACT To DEvisE.-As shown by recent cases, there
is a wide difference of opinion on the degree of part performance
which is necessary to enable the beneficiary' of an oral contract to
devise, to obtain equitable relief thereunder.
In Hooks v. Bridgcvater,2 a recent Texas case, one Davis -had
orally agreed with the plaintiff's father that if the plaintiff, aged
nine, would come into Davis' home and live with him as a son
during Davis' life, he would devise to the plaintiff all his property.
The plaintiff fully performed, and Davis died without letting the
plaintiff into possession of any of the land, and without making
"See Expert Testimony Bill, drawn by the Committee of the American
Institute of Crim. Law and Criminology, contained in'Keedy, supra note io.
Win. T. Williamson (representing the Oregon State Med. Ass'n), i Olmwx
L REv. ioo, Iog (1922). Win. A. White, Expert Testimony in Criminal
Procedure, ii J. Cr. L. and Cr. 499. Also 36 HARv. L. REv. 335.
' See 22 Cyc. i21g, Notes 81, 82; and 1220, note 83. Also Win. T. Wil-
liamson, supra note 39.
- ' 1See Rex v. True, i6 Cr. App. R. 164, i27 L T. 561, and the note on
this case in 66 Sol. J. 484. Also Comm. v. Hallowell, supra note 14, where
three alienists and 40 witnesses, "neighbors and acquaintances," "impressive
not only in numbers, but in intelligence and character as well," testified that the
prisoner was insane, yet he was convicted.
The term "beneficiary" can equally apply to the 'Promise in cases, where
the promise is made to him for his own benefit, and he has rendered part
performance. -
2 111 Tex. 122, 229 S. W. .1114 (1922).
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a will. In the plaintiff's action for equitable relief, it was held that
the performance by the plaintiff did not take the contract out of
the operation of the statute of frauds, the rule being stated that
possession of the land and improvements thereon would be the only
performance which would have this effect.
On the other hand, the opposite result was reached in the still
later case of Johnson v. Bedal,3 in which the facts were essentially
similar. One Johnson had orally agreed with the plaintiff's father
that if the plaintiff, then aged three years, would be given to him
to raise and would live in his home until she reached her majority,
he would legally adopt her and leave her a child's share of his land.
The plaintiff entirely performed, and Johnson performed so far
as to have the plaintiff legally adopted by himself and his wife.
Johnson died testate, the plaintiff not being mentioned in the will.
Plaintiff based her action on the oral contract. The court granted
relief, holding that the contract was removed from the operation
of the statute by the performance of the plaintiff, and further say-
ing that possession of the land was not necessary.
These cases are but echoes of the discord which prevails on this
question, but they offer the opportunity for an interesting examina-
tion into the cause of such a lack of harmony.
First, upon looking to the typical situation contained in the cases
above, the hardship which will result from a strict application of
the rule in Hooks v. Brid.qzatcr becomes apparent. That the-ele-
ment of filial obedience is incapable of being measured in money
is hardly to be doubted, but still, under the requirements of pos-
session and improvements, the beneficiary could remain in strict
filial obedience for any number of years under a clearly proven oral
contract 4 and still acquire no right other than an inadequate quan-
tun meruit.0  The hardship of such a situation has been recognized
and lamented,0 and leads one to investigate the theory upon which
such a situation has come to have the sanction of courts of equity.
In Hooks v. Bridgwatcr, the court proceeded entirely on the
theory that the equitable right of the beneficiary was one of specific
performance.? Beginning then with the proposition that the oral
a218 Pac. 614 (Idaho, z923).
' It is assumed in this entire discussion that the oral contract is clearly
proved, for there is unanimity on the point that unless the evidence of the
contract be "so clear and convincing as to leave no doubt of the actual exist-
ence of the agreement," the entire case falls. Hayworth v. Hayworth, 236
S. W. 26 (Mo., 192).
'Wallace v. Long, io5 Ind. 52-, 5 N. E. 666 (i88s).
'Rhodes v. Rhodes. 3 Sandf. Ch. 279 (N. Y., x846); Lothrop v. Marble,
12 S. D. 5rr, 81 N. W. 885 (igoo).
'"The question presented by the feature of this case is whether the
performance of the contract by the plaintiff-renders the contract enforce-
able in equity."
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contract to devise is merely an oral contract for the sale of land,
and proceeding on this theory of specific performance, the natural
result is to apply to the contract to devise, all the existing law ap-
plicable to the specific performance of any oral contract for the
sale of land.' Then, when a question of part performance is before
the court, it looks to its precedents, finds that they require the bene-
ficiary to show at least possession of the land and improvements
upon it," and concludes that these requirements are equally appli-
cable to a contract to devise. When this is done, the rule in Hooks
v. Bridgwater is the result. 1"
The vulnerable point in this entire theory is its very founda-
tion, namely, the misconception that the beneficiary's right is one
of specific performance. From the very nature of the contract
to devise, which is a contract to make a will, it is incapable of
specific performance." It is rudimentary that a court of equity
will not issue a decree which it cannot enforce ;2 and the ambula-
tory character of a will renders nugatory any decree purporting to
enforce its execution. It seems, therefore, that the rule in Hooks v.
Bridgwater is grounded on a fallacious theory.
The true nature of the beneficiary's equitable right is stated by
Brown, J., in the recent case of Mathews v. Tobias 13 thus- Equity
will, in a proper case, enforce the agreement by seizing the property
which is the subject matter thereof, and fastening a trust on it in
favor of the person to whom the decedent agreed to give it by
will." 14 What then, is a "proper .case" for the exercise of this
jurisdiction? When does such a trust come into -existence?
"'A contract to devise land is not materially different from one to con-
vey land, and, to be enforceable, must conform to all the legal requirements
essential to a contract of conveyance inter ?Avos." Henderson v. Davis, i9i
S. W. 358 (Tex. Civ. App., x91).
'Such is the general rule in this country, any other acts being deemed
not "unequivocally referable to the contract." 36 Cyc. 654. It is recognized
in Hooks v. Bridgwater, note 2, supra, in these words: "From an early time
it has been the rule of this court, steadily adhered to, that to relieve a parol
sale of land from the operation of the statute of frauds, three things are
necessary: i. Payment of consideration; 2. Possession by vendee; 3. Im-
provements by vendee."
"'Other cases in which the same result was achieved in remarkably simi-
lar manner are: Grindling v. Rehyl, 149 Mich. 64r, 113 N. W.2o (igol);
Wallace v. Long, io5 Ind. 522, 5 N. E. 666 (S).
'Colby v. Colby, 8r Hun 221, 3o N. Y. 677 (1894); 36 Cyc. 735 and
cases there collected.
""Jurisdiction of equity will not be exercised to decree specific per-
formance, however inadequate may be the remedy for damages, where the
contract is of such a nature that the obedience to the decree could not be
compelled by the ordinary processes of the court:' 'McCullock, J., in Leon-
ard v. Plum Bayon, 79 Ark. 42. 94 S. NV. 922 (1886). See also Sellers v._
Green, 172 Il. 549, 5o N. E. 246 (:898).
11ot Oregon 6o5, .2ot Pac. t99 (i92).
"Compare the statement in Pomeroy, Specific Performance (2d ed.,
The trust being one which arises by implication of law, it is
not within the statute of frauds," and is constructed solely for the
purpose of remedying a wrong.1" It has been stated that fraud
is 'the wrong which such a trust is constructed to rectify, but the
division of "fraud" into "actual" and "constructive" fraud has so
widened the term that "the defendant's intent to retain the property
when it is a violation of common honesty for him to retain it, is
the only fraudulent intent which equity needs to justify it in de-
claring a constructive trust to exist." 27
Proceeding on this theory, then, the question in each case of
part performance is merely whether a retention by the grantee or
devisee of the promisor, after an acquisition of the property with
notice of the oral agreement is a "violation of coimon honesty."
On this basis, the decision in Bedal v. Johnson that such a reten-
tion where the beneficiary had remained in filial obedience to the
promissor for eighteen years, was a "'violation of common hon-
esty" is not surprising-'8
It seems, therefore, that the lack of harmony in the decisions
on the whole subject is due to the fact that the courts which differ
in result, fundamentally disagree on the theory upon which they
base their decisions. It also seems that the keynote of the view in
Hooks v. Bridgwatcr is the one which is false, and that, in order
to produce the desired harmony in result, this should be altered
and brought in tune with that which is fundamental in the view
adopted in Bedal v. Johnson.
M1. E.G.
How FAR THE RIGHT TO VOTE IS ABsoLrE.-The right to
vote for state officials is a privilege derived from constitutional
grant and is not a natural right of citizenship." The state con-
stitutions usually grant to all citizens of the states who are citi-
1897), :8 note: "The relief is granted, not by ordering a will to be made,
but by regarding the property in the hands of the heirs, devisees, assignees
or personal representatives of the promissor, as impressed with a trust in
favor of the plaintiff." Also, see Van Duyne v. Vreeland, it N. J. Eq. 370,
,3 Stockt. 37G (1857).
"Bogert, Trusts (ist ed., 192i), 1i8, collects numerous cases on this
point.
" Clark, Equity (ist ed., 1919) 330.
"Costigan, "The Classification of Trusts," 27 HARv. L. REV. 437.
' The same result was reached in like manner in Turnipseed v. Sirrine,
57 S. C. 559, 35 S. E. 757 (igoo); and in Dalby v. Maxfield, 244 Ill. 214,
91 N. E. 42o (igio).
'People of the State of New York v. Barber, 48 Hun i98 (N. Y., 1888).
See cases cited in 20 C. J. 6o, footnote 28. Also, McCrary, Elections (4th'
ed., 1897).
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zens of the.United States the right to vote at any election if they
fulfill certain prescribed qualifications.2  Although the right to vote
when granted is absolute, it can be reasonably regulated by the state
legislature,3 subject, of course, to the restrictions in the Federal
Constitution.' It has been almost universally held that registration
laws are a reasonable regulation."
One of the most widespread of the regulatory enactments was
the Australian ballot act which provided for an official ballot, the
use of all other ballots being prohibited.' Usually the state either
included in these acts, or subsequently enacted, uniform rules for
the nomination of candidates. These acts have been declared to be
constitutional because they do not confine the voters to the names
printed on the ballot but either expressly or impliedly give him the
privilege of adding any name he sees fit.' So sacred is this right
that a statute, declaring that votes for candidates whose names
were not printed on the ballot were not to be counted, was held
to be unconstitutional." lany states have indicated that they would
have taken a similar position had they construed the statute before
them as a deirivation of the right to add other names.9  Only one
court seems to have declared such a statute to be constitutional.10
The cases have gone far in upholding this right of insertion. They
have counted votes for a candidate who was disqualified because
defeated at the primaries 11 or because he was out of the state.12 In
the recent case of Stewart v. Cartwright et al.,13 the realtors peti-
tioned for a mandamus to compel the election officials to count the
'Example: Const. of Ga., Art. 2, Sec. i, par. 2 (Civil Code, Sec. 6396).
'Matter of Terry, 146 App. Div. 520, 13 N. Y. S. 841 (N. Y., i911);
De Walt e aL. v. Bartley et aL., 146 Pa. 529 24 Atl i85 (1892); Common
Council of Detroit v. Rush, 82 Mich. 532, 46 N. W. 95i (889).
'United States v. Cruikshank et al., 92 U. S. 542 (1875); Lackey v. U.
S., io, Fed: 114 (C. C. A., igoi). See note in 53 L. R. A. 66o.
6 Capen v. Foster et al., 12 Pick. 485 (Mass., 1832); People ex rel.
Foley v. Kopplekom, 16 Mich. 342 (i868). See "Constitutionality of Regis-
try Laws," 28 Cent. L. J. 2io (1889).
'For history of Australian Ballot Laws and a list of statutes, see Mc-
Crary, Elections (4th ed., 1897), 5oo et seq.
" State ex rel. Lamar, Atty. Gen., v. Dillon et al., 32 Fla. 545, 14 So. 383
(i893) ; Cole v. Tucker et al., 164 Mass. 486, 41 N. E. 681 (I895); People
ex rel. Goring v. Wappingers Falls, 144 N. Y. 616, 45 N. Y. S. 344 (i895).
'Littlejohn v. People ex rcl. Desch, 52 Colo. 217, 121 Pac. 359 (972).
'Sanner v. Patton, 155 Ill. 553, 40 N. E. 2W (i895); Barr v. Cardell,
173 Iowa 18, i55 N. W. 3X2 (i915).
"Chamberlain v. Wood ct al, i5 S. D. 216. 88 N. W. iog (igoi); Mc-
Kenzie v.'Boykin, iiI Miss. 256 (i916).
"1Lacombe v. Laborde, i32 La. 435 (1913).
" State ex rcl. Atty. Gen. v. Ratliff et al., io8 Miss. 242, 66 So. 538 (914).
See, also, Sanner v. Patton, supra note 9.
. 118 S. E. 8s9 (Ga. 3923).
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votes cast for candidate A and to reject those cast for candidate
B whose name had not been printed on the ballot. The court re-
fused to grant the mandamus because of the failure to allege suf-
ficient facts but decided that the addition .of B's name did not
render the ballot unofficial. The correct conclusion seems to have
been reached as to the legality of the ballots.
A second and more difficult problem arises in determining the
validity of votes cast for a candidate whose name is printed on the
ballot without a semblance of irregularity but who actually was
improperly or illegally nominated. The English courts have de-
cided that statutory requirements as to nomination are mandatory
and that if they are not complied with, the votes shall not be
counted.' 4  There seems to have been a slight tendency on the part
of the American courts to follow the English rule:15 but the ma-
jority of the states have allowed the votes cast for a candidate il-
legally or irregularly nominated to be counted. The following
irregularities have been held not to invalidate an election: where
the nomination was made by a person or political party not entitled
to make the nomination ;16 where the nomination was made in an
improper manner ;"? failure to file a certificate of nomination within
statutory period ;18 failure to file any certificate of nomination ; can-
didate's name placed on the ballot by petition although same was
contrary to statute.20 Several courts have gone further and have
decided that fraud on the part of the nominee would not invalidate
the election.2 ' The principal easons upon which the above deci-
sions depend are, first, that the statutory right of the voter who
votes in good faith should not be curtailed; and second, that the
objection to the nomination was not made until after the election.
On principle it does not seem plausible that the English view should
influence the American courts, for an English statute gives the
right to question an election after it has taken place and such a
"Queen v. Parkinson, L, P. 3 Q. B. ii (Eng., 1867); Dowes and
Pierce v. Turner and Wright, x C. P. D. 670 (Eng, 1876); Mather'v.
Brown, I C. P. D. 596 (Eng., 1876); Monks v. Jackson, I C. P. D. 683
(Eng., 1876).
'Price v. Lush, io Mont. 61, 24 Pac. 749 (189O), overruled in Stack-
pole v. Hallahan, x6 Mont. 40, 40 Pac. 8o (1895). See, also, King v. Mc-
Mahan, x79 Ky. 536 (igi).
"Nebraska ex rel. Crawford v. Norris, 37 Ne. 299, 55 N. W. io86
(1893); Schuler v. Hogan, 168 Ill. 369, 48 N. E. 195 (1897).
"Baker v. Scott, 4 Idaho 596, 43 Pac. 76 (1895); N. Y. ex rel. Hirsh
v. Wood, 148 N. Y. 142, 42 N. E. 536 (1896).
"Blackmer v. Hildreih et al., i8x Mass. 29, 63 N. E. 14 (1902).
"Peabody v. Burch et al., 75 Kans. 5W3, 89 Pac. 1o6 (19o7).
"Johnson v. Bauchle, 149 Minn. 144 (192r).
'Territory ex rel. Willis v. Kanealii, 17 Hawaii 243 (-9o5); State ex tel.
Dithmar v. Bunnell, 131 Wis. i98, io N." W. 177 (i9o7); Lewis v. Boynton,
25 Colo. 486, 55 Pac. 732 (1898).
178 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
statute is the supreme law of England, that- country lacking a con-
stitution.2
In State cx rel. Conner vi. Noctor et al. and Aloctor et'al. v.
State cx tel. Lnchan et al.24 a slightly different problem was pre-
sented to the court. The state constitution as amended provided
that "all nominations . . . shall be made at direct primary elections
or by a petition as provided by law." 2- The legislature had passed
no statute on nomination by petition which affected the election in
question. Candidate A was nominated by petition, his name was
printed on the ballot, and numerous votes were cast for hin.
The court refused to grant a mandamus compelling the election'
officers to count the votes for A, upon the ground that the General
Assembly had omitted to provide for nomination by petition.
It is submitted that this conclusion can be justly criticised. The
provision in the constitution can be interpreted as being discretion-
ary, thereby giving to the Assembly the power to sanction or reject
the privilege of nomination by petition, but even if the Assembly
had not sanctioned nomination by petition the cases cited above sug-
gest that if the nominee's name was printed on the ballot, the voters
voted in good faith, and no objection was taken until after the
election, the votes should be counted. Another court in a recent
case allowed votes cast fo a candidate nominated by petition to be
counted although a statute only provided for nomination by direct
primary
2 6
If this clause in the constitution is interpreted as mandatory,
there is given the absolute right of nomination by petition, but the
power to prescribe the election machinery is delegated to the as-
sembly. Under such a construction, failure to provide regulations
should not rob the voter of his franchise. Against this view and
the view as to irregularity in nomination taken by the majority
of the American courts, there seem to be two strong objections:
first, that the door to fraud is opened; second, that the effectiveness
of the nomination laws is greatly impaired. Although the force of
these arguments cannot be denied, it seems that they can be suc-
cessfully met. In no other way is the innocent electorate guaran-
teed the right to have its voie counted. The right to object to
irregular nominations before the election is not abrogated; nor are
the nomination statutes prevented from doing that which they were
primarily supposed to do-namely, declare a nomination, as opposed
to an election, void if not properly made.
C.B.W.
38 and 39 Vict., c. 40, sec. I.
i4o N. E. 878 (Ohio, 1923).
i4o N. E. I4 (Ohio, 1923).
Constitution of Ohio, adopted Sept. 3, 1912, Sec. 7, Art. V.
' Swiney et aL v. Seden ct a., 3o6 IIL 131, 137 N. E. 405 (x923).
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CHANGE OF POSITION AS A DEFENSE IN QUASI-CONTRACTS.-
The action for recovery back of money paid under mistake of fact,
being a quasi-contractual action and based, therefore, on grounds
of natural equity, is subject to many equitable defenses not avail-
able against other legal actions.' In general, the recovery is al-
lowed on the theory that the defendant has received money which
it is not just that he should keep, and which, in good conscience,
he should repay to the plaintiff. Under this theory, there should be
no recovery if circumstances occur which should permit the defend-
ant, in good conscience, to refuse to return the money. So, if the
defendant substantially and irrevocably changes his position as a
result of the payment, it seems that recovery of the money from
him should not be allowed, at least when he is not himself at fault.
The courts have allowed this defense when the plaintiff's neg-
ligence or fault was mainly responsible for the mistaken payment
in the first instance.2 And they have refused it, justifiably in view
of the nature of the action, when the defendant's negligence or fault
was the main factor in causing mistaken payment in the first instance.3
When either party is more at fault than the other in causing the
mistaken payment, and the defendant has changed his position, as
a result of the mistaken payment, it would seem that the defend-
ant's equity to retain the moneyr is as strong as the plaintiff's equity
to get it back-and so the defendant, having the possession and
the legal title to the money, should keep it. But the decisions on
this point are in conflict. Some cases refuse to recognize the de-
fense and allow a recovery even wvhen the defendant, as a result
of the payment, has altered his position to the extent of giving up
a security, lien, or right of action.4  But there is another line of
cases holding that, when the defendant has so substantially altered
his position as a result of the payment, the plaintiff cannot recover
it back.5 This defense has also been allowed in some cases where
the plaintiff's mistaken payment has led to the defendant's' paying
over the sum to a third party from whom he cannot recover it.
The same rules apply to actions for the recovery back of money paid
under mistake of law, in such jurisdictions such recovery is allowed. Cf.Note 8, infra.
'Wilson v. Barker, 5o Me. 447 (1852); Continental Bank v. Trades-
men's Bank, 173 N. Y. 27'2, 65 N. E. xxo8 (i9o3).
'Union Bank v. U. S. Bank, 3 Mass. 74 (i8o7); Phetteplace v. Bucklin,
I8 R. 1. 297, 27 AtI. 211 (1893).
' Durrant v. Ecclesiastical Commissioners, 6 Q. B. D. 234 (i88o) ; Kings-
ton Bank v. Eltinge, 40 N. Y. 391 (1869); Bank of Toronto v. Hamilton, 28
Ont. S1 (1898).
'Boas v. Updegrove, 5 Pa. 5x6 (1847).
'Such is the case of a raised draft on the plaintiff bank, collected by
the defendant, under a restricted endorsement relieving the defendant of any
implied warranty, and paid over by it, without neglizence. to the forger.
The plaintiff bank was not allowed to recover back the money mistakenly
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In general, the courts have allowed this defense only when the
defendant has substantially changed his position by giving up a
security of right of action or paid over the money to a third party
without having received the benefit of the money himself. The great
extension of the doctrine until recently has been the case where the
defendant's change of position consisted merely in giving up a se-
curity which was in fact valueless.1
In the recent case of Holt v. Mlarkham, the English Court of
Appeal has allowed the defense and refused recovery where the
only change in the defendant's position was an expenditure of the
money for things which he would not otherwise have purchased.
The defendant in that case was a demobilized officer of the Royal
Air Force. By certain regulations officers in the Royal Air Force
were entitled to a-bonus varying according to certain circumstances.
The plaintiffs, the Government agents for the payment of the bonus,
mistaking the defendant's classification 9 and also forgetting that
such classification decreased the amount of his bonus, paid him 1434,
more than the £31G to which he was entitled. More than a year
afterwards, when the defendant had invested the money in stock
which had become nearly worthless, the plaintiffs sued to recover
back the excess payment as money paid in mistake of fact. It was
held that the plaintiffs could not recover on the ground of a so-
called estoppel, in that the defendant had been led by the plain-
tiff's conduct to believe that the money was his own, and had altered
his position by spending it for this stock, which he would not
otherwise have purchased. Under such circumstances the court
considered it inequitable to compel him to repay the money to the
plaintiffs.
This case is considerably in advance of anything previously
decided on this subject. In no former case did the courts refuse
recovery on the ground of the defendant's change of position unless
he had paid over the money to his principal or cestui que trust, and
so had parted with the money without receiving any personal bene-
fit from it, or else had given up at least a theoretical legal right
paid, to the defendants. Crocker-Woolworth National Bank v. Nevada Bank,
139 Cal. 564, 73 Pac. 456 (i9o3); Union Bank v. Ontario Bank, 24 Low.
Can. Jur. 309 (i88o).
t Behring v. Somerville, 63 N. J. L. 68, 44 Atl. 641 (1899).
* L R. [1923] i K. B. 504.
'There was another ground for this decision, in that a mistake of law
concur.red with the mistake of fact in inducing the mistaken payment. In
jurisdictions, including England, in which money paid in mistake of law
cannot be recovered, recovery will also be denied, on principle, when a mis-
take of law concurs with the mistake of fact in inducing the payment. Needles
v. Burk, 8x Mo. 569 (1884). The court, however, in the principal case placed
their decision squarely on the ground of the defendant's change of position,
although some of the judges mention this concurrent mistake of law as
also precluding recovery.
NOTES
as a result of the plaintiff's mistaken payment. In some early Eng-
lish cases, it is true, there are dicta that if the defendant, in conse-
quence of the payment had changed his mode of living, or even had
spent this money for things which he would not otherwise have
purchased, the plaintiff would not be allowed to recover the money
mistakenly paid." This principle was not applied, however, in any
'later English case in which this state of facts was presented, until
the present. While the decision goes so far beyond any other in
this field, yet it seems both logical and just. The equity of the
defendant to refuse to restore this money is at least as high as the
equity as the plaintiff to have it returned. Therefore, the defend-
ant, having obtained title to the money, should not be compelled to
give it up 2 GG.F.F.
RIGHTS OF A CONDITIONAL VENDOR UNDER TIE NATIONAL
POi11iUTION ACT.-Two cases have recently been decided involv-
ing the rights of an innocent third party who had title to a vehicle
seized by the government in its attempt to enforce the section of
the Prohibition ActI which provides for the payment of bona fide
liens out the proceeds from the sale of the vehicle so seized. In
each case the person who asked for the amount of his lien had sold
the vehicle conditionally in jurisdictions where such sales were valid
only when recorded. In United States v. TorrCs,2 in which the court
interpreted a 'Maryland statute,3 the vendor, under the clause aiding
holders of bona fidc liens,' was granted the amount of his lien,
though his conditional sale was not recorded. Relief was denied- in
United States v. Aontgomery, even though the conditional vendor
had recorded his sale under the laws of Arizona." The court de-
nied that a conditional sale was a lien.
The language of the Maryland statute " was sufficiently broad
to permit the federal authorities to take the vehicle free from en-
cumbrances, had the court chosen to construe in this way the re-
"Brisbane v. Dacres, 5 Taunton 143, 162 (1813); Skyring v. Greenwood,
4 B. & C. 281 (1825).
"1Cf. Durrant v. Ecclesiastical Commissioners, supra note 4.
Cf. Woodward. Quasi-Contracts, 45; Costigan, Change of Position as
a Defense in Quasi-Contracts, 2o H.Rv. 1 Rrv. 2o5.
'National Prohibition Act, 41 Stat. at L 315, section 26, title z
1291 Fed. 138 0923).
'Code, Art. 21, sec. 53, which reads, "shall . . . be void as to third
pcrsons without notice until such contract be . . . recorded . .
'National Prohibition Act, 41 Stat. at T- 315, section 26, title 2.
'289 Fed. 125 (IW3).
'Arizona Civil Code 1913, sec. 3278.
1 Supra note 3.
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cording act, which was before it for the first time. But it was
decided that the United States was not "such third person" as the
legislature wished to protect. In view of the numerous decisions
construing similar acts, there can be no doubt that the view taken
by the court was the correct one. Such statutes have been uni-
formly held to be for the benefit of persons who changed their
financial condition, relying on appearances. 8
Before the respective rights of a conditional vendor and those
of the federal or state government can be considered, the decision in
the case, which denied that a conditional sale created a lien on the
vehicle sold, makes it necessary to determine the meaning of "liens"
as used in the Volstead Act. Had Congress used the word in its
strict common law sense the court's view that a conditional vendor
does not have a "lien" would have been undoubtedly correct. But
the very language of the statute ' makes it obvious that the holder
of the "'lien" need not be in possession. The word "lien" is un-
doubtedly used in the broad sense of encumbrance." This seems
to be the view taken in the case which allowed the vendor the amount
of his lien. The same view has been adopted in many other cases,
both in federal and state courts, where this question was raised." ,x
Whether the vendor who has retained title may assert it against
the government becomes a very important question by reason of the
conflict on the effect of the Volstead Act on the Revenue Act. Under
the latter act it is provided that where a vehicle is engaged in trans-
portation of liquor, with intent to defraud the United States of its
tax, such vehicle shall be forfeited. 2 The proceedings are in rein
and the government may confiscate the property without regard to
the innocence of the owner.13 The case which protected the inno-
cent vendor concluded 14 that the government might still proceed
Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Wardlaw, 1i6 S. . 207 (Ga. 1923),
construing Ga. Civil Code (igio), see. 3318; Gayle Motor Co. v. Gray-Acree
Motor Co., 2o6 Ala. 586, go So. 334 (i92), construing Ala. Civil Code
(o7), sec. 3394; State v. Hall, 91 W. Va. 648, 14 S. F. 250 (i923), con-
struing "Uniform Conditional Sales Law," Chapter 75, Acts of i921.
'Section 26, title 2, provides: "The court, upon conviction of the person
so arrested . . . unless good cause to the contrary is shown by the
owner, shall order a sale by public auction of the property seized . . ,
and the officer shall pay all liens . . . as being bona fide and as hav-
ing been created without the lienor having any notice that the carryin
vehicle was being used or was to be used for illegal transportation of liquor."
"For definitions of "lien," see Words and Phrases, 4145.
'State v. Davis, 55 Utah 54, 184 Pac. i6o (x9g); Naylor v. Semmons,
33 Idaho 320, 194 Pac. 94 (192o); Boles et at. v. State, 77 Okla. 310, 188"
Pac. 681 (192o); State v. One Paige Touring Car, i2o Me. 496, 1i5 At. 275
(i9vi); State v. Hall et al., 91 W. Va. 648, 114 S. . 250 (1922).
"Comp. Stat., sec. 635z; Revised Stat. 345o.
On the general subject of forfeiture of vehicle seized while carrying
intoxicating liquor, see note 34 HARv. L REY. 20.
'Supra Note 2.
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in ren tinder the Internal Revenue Act, provided there has been
ro conviction under the Volstead Act.'" The court based its opin-
ion on the case of the United States v. Stafoff?8 But in that case
the construction of the statutes 'T now involved was not before the
court. Mr. Justice lolmes. after interpreting several other provi-
sions of each act, said in no uncertain terms that "'a certified ques-
tion as to the effect of the National Prohibition Act on the revenue
laws generally is too broad to require answer." I" It would seem,
therefore, that the court with equal reason could have reached the
conclusion that the proceedings must be under the National Prohibi--
tion Act solely.
In this state of the law it is interesting to note the decisions
of the lower Federal Courts, which seem to suggest every possible
solution. Two courts have flatly decided that proceedings must
now be brought under the National Prohibition Act, under which
"bona fide lienors" will be protected.2 0  A second view is that the
National Prohibition Act does not impliedly repeal the procedure
under the Revenue Act and that forfeiture under the latter alone
would be valid.21 Another interpretation offered is that, though the
Volstead Act repeals the custom laws, yet. if the proceedings be a
libel, an innocent lienor cannot be protected.2 2  A slightly different
view from those suggested is that the Prohibition Act intended only
to punish the wrongdoer. But the court will not say that this is
the only remedy of the government.
2 3
Whether the view finally adopted is to be that the Govern-
ment must proceed under the National Prohibition Act, or may
still elect its remedy, it would appear from a survey of the decisions
of the several states where acts similar to the National Prohibition
Act are in force that, if the proceeding is to be had under the act,
"Supra Note I.
'43 Sup. Ct. 197 (1923).
"Supra Notes 9 and 12.
"Supra Note 16 at page i99.
"It is at least arguable that proceedings whereby a bona fidc lienor will
be protected and proceedings under which the vehicle may he confiscated
regardless of the innocence of the owner are in conflict. In view of section
, of the Act Supplemental to the National Prohibition Act (42 Stat. 222, c.
134). providing for the repeal of any section of the revenue law directly in
conflict with that of the National Prohibition Act, it is submitted the court
should have reached a different conclusion.
"United States v. One Haynes Automobile, 274 Fed. 926 (292i); United
States v. One Paige Automobile, 277 Fed. 524 (1922). -
'Leo Atlanta Co. v. Stern, 279 Fed. 422 (1922). U. S. v. Torres, supra
note 2, also adopts the view that the Government has an election of remedies.
'United States v. One Hudson Touring Car, 274 Fed. 473 (1921). It
is difficult to see how this interpretation can be sound in view of the express
words of the statute (supra note 9).
"United States v. Sylvester, 273 Fed. 253 (192T).
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the conditional vendor will be protected.' One court, however, in
a none too convincing opinion construed an enforcement statute as a
proceeding in rem, under which the vehicle was to be forfeited
irrespective of the inocence of the owner ;21 this too, in spite of the
fact that that the legislature intended to protect the innocent owner.
Universally, the burden has been placed on the vendor to prove
his lack of knowledge of the unlawful use to which the'vehicle
has been put.28
It is difficult to conclude what will be the final resting point
in balancing the respective rights of the government and the inno-
cent vendor. 'Much will depend on the effect of the National Pro-
hibition Act on the Revenue Law as to the right of seizure. It is
greatly to be regretted that Mr. Justice Holmes did not see fit to
declare his view upon this point." If it be ultimately established
that the revenue laws are repealed pro tanto, then the road is open
to collusion between a conditional vendor and a trafficker in intoxi-
cating liquors. The vehicle would never be subject to seizure, if.
the parties could cover their tracks, and the effective enforcement
of the laws might be seriously jeopardized. If the procedure under
the revenue laws is to be an alternative remedy, then procedure
under this act will forfeif the vehicle seized regardless of the inno-
cence of the owner'. For effective enforcement of the Volstead Act
it is submitted that it would be better to have a provision for such
forfeiture of the vehicle.
MS.
"See cases cited in notes 8 and ii, supra.
I Landers v. Commonwealth, 126 Va. 78a, ior S. E. 778 ()i9). A note in
34 HARV. L. REv. 2o2 discussing State v. Bucholz, 127 Va. 794, 102 S. E.
76o (i92o),- seeks to explain the decision on the ground that the vendor
assumed the risk. It is submitted that this" explanation is unnecessary in
view of the decision in Landers v. Commonwealth.
' State x rcl. Tate v. One Lexington Automobile, 2o3 Ala. 5o6, 84 So.
297 (igig); State v. Davis e al., 5 Utah 54, i84 Pac. 161 (i9g9); Whites
v. State, 23 Ga. App. 174, 98 S. E. 171 (1919); State v. One -Paige Touring
Car, i2o Me. 496, xi5 At. 275 (gzr).
"Supra note x6.
